STATE AND IR IN RETREAT: TERRORISM AS A CHALLENGE TO STATE CENTRISM IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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Abstract

The state has been the fundamental unit of analysis as far as International Relations is concerned. However, the centrality of the state in IR has been put to the test time and again, and this time around by a phenomenon, which was hitherto localized and often neglected: terrorism. It has been established that terrorism has existed much before its present phase, as described by David Rapoport in his theory of 'wave phenomena.' This paper is an attempt to examine the impact of terrorism on various strands of state centrality (Public attitude, State capacity) in international relations. It shall also assess the extent to which these groups have managed to challenge the capacity of the state. The paper shall not necessarily confine itself to the nature or *modus operandi* of such groups, but rather to the broader impact this phenomenon has had on the work and thinking about international politics. It also draws attention towards the state's response to such a phenomenon, and how that response has forged the nature of IR as a discipline and international relations as subject matter for generations to come. It has also been established that the states have used different means to curb terrorism, which has potentially further decreased the democratic quotient even in liberal democracies.

Keywords

Terrorism, Sovereignty, Intervention, State, Public, IR

Introduction

International Relations as an academic discipline is relatively new. Given the emergence and the nature of the discipline, the notions of state and war have been central to its existence. Within the disciplinary history of IR itself, one comes across various debates at different historical junctures, which have been

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indirectly influenced by the emerging geopolitical realities the great power politics that dominated the field have been replaced by the emergence of non-state actors, which have not only challenged the states within but the global security architecture as well. One such phenomenon, which emerged as a major challenge to state-centric international relations but also has stretched the frontiers of discipline, has been the phenomenon of *Terrorism*. *Terrorism* has been defined differently at different historical junctures. As per the conventional understanding, terrorism could be defined as the use of force, fear, or threat by non-state armed actors against the state or civilians to achieve political or ideological ends. However, *Alex P Schmid* has questioned any such definitional certainty of terrorism at the global level. Schmid is of the opinion that defining the terrorist depends on those who do this act of defining, and mostly, the governments define who or which organizations qualify to be defined as a terrorist. Terrorism of any type has a lasting impact. Since it has been analysed more under the ambit of organizations and not the phenomenon, there seems to be a relatively incomplete flow of discourses about it.

Hence, the contribution of *David Rapoport* in this context becomes pertinent. To explain in detail, the conceptual history of 'modern terrorism', Rapoport has used the notion of what he refers to as 'wave phenomena'. According to Rappaport, "*waves are special activity happening during a time period characterized by expansion and contraction and specialized by the feature of having an international character.'* He argues further that these waves impact the organization and may advance a lasting impact by either continuing the existence of an organization or by contributing to its disappearance if it does not inspire it. This contest about the definitions of terrorism has been widely accepted in contemporary discourse on the same. Interestingly, in present times, the role of state-sponsored terrorism has dominated the discourse on terrorism. Since the state is the essential entity in international politics, we would try to analyze the impacts of terrorism on various elements correlated to the state.

Conception of the State

One of the profound impacts of terrorism can be located in comprehending the concept of the state. The paper will look into the idea of the state through what has been referred to as the Westphalian state. Although there are possibilities of differing natures of state in a post-colonial world, from the Weberian conception of the state, it has been envisioned as an organized entity that holds a monopoly of the legitimate use of violence. On the other hand, Varshney defines terrorism as an act of collective violence. 'Collective violence, according to Varshney, can be defined as "violence perpetrated by a group on another group, by a group on an individual, or by an individual on a group" (Varshney 2009, 279).

Such authority of the state seems to be akin to what contractualist theorists forwarded. As the theory suggests, civilians surrender some of their rights before the state in exchange for the protection of those rights by the state. However, the construction of the state is such that it is deemed to have an upper hand in using violence. In the language of *Max Weber,* it can be called *'monopoly of the legitimate use of violence within a given territory.'* Any state that fails to exercise authority ceases to be one, or at most could be defined as a failed state. There are different ways in which a conflict emerges within a state; one of the reasons for the same could be excessive use of force on the part of the state itself. And the one who revolts either to ensure some changes in the existing system or to entirely establish a new system becomes a criminal in the eyes of that state.

These dissenting voices later set up certain organizations and not only challenge the principle of sovereignty but also challenge the principle of territoriality and citizenship (Varshney, 2009). Varshney has employed this argument while discussing the demands made by ethnic groups, but in this paper, its usage has been extended to other groups, particularly those who forge this idea of collective violence as a means to achieve political ends. This leads to unjustified repressive measures towards certain groups or people. Exercise of this influence by the state is important. *'Sovereignty is best conceptualized in terms of not state control but of state authority'* (Thomson 1995, 214). Apart from that, broadly, such activities undermine the internal sovereignty of the state by an individual or a group.

However, one of the essential features of what Rapoport refers to as 'wave phenomena' has been its international character. These organizations act not only within the boundaries of a particular state, but beyond it as well, thus taking the course of extra-territoriality. Assessing the four waves of modern terrorism (anarchist, anti-colonial, new left, and religious) put forward by *David Rapoport,* we find that all of them have an extraterritorial reach. This can be understood by the *'movement of strategies* and the people associated with them. For example, the strategies of assassinations during the anarchist wave 1880-1920), and the struggles against colonialism (1920-1960), excessive internationalism during the new left wave 1950-1990), and the centrality of religion in the fourth wave (1979- till date). These groups sometimes operate from beyond the boundaries of the host state, and may also be operating against multiple states simultaneously.

Thus, this helps one to figure out the threat to the external sovereignty of the state, where the acts of violence are planned or orchestrated from beyond the borders of a particular state. However, it becomes equally important to notice whether the notion of sovereignty has been used to justify state

action or means to perpetuate illegal acts against individuals, groups, or states. The argument has recently been used by great powers to infringe on the territorial integrity of the weaker nations, resulting in further violation of the rights of the people. One such example could be the United States military intervention in Iraq. Such an attempt at the *'selective sovereignty'* approach fits the notion of *'organized hypocrisy'* put forward by Stephen Krasner, which refers to 'the presence of long-standing norms [in this case, non-intervention] that are frequently violated' for the sake of some 'higher principles' – violations that are generally tolerated by the international community (Acharya 2007). Here, higher principles were an amalgamation of violations, hence Acharya prefers to call it *'disorganized hypocrisy.'* Though this is not the major point of our analysis, one should be aware of this side of the discourse. The other part is being understood through the Westphalian Treaty of 1648.

Evolution of the Westphalian Order and Brands of Terrorism

After the end of thirty years of war (1618-1648), the Treaty of Westphalia was significant in laying the new foundation for the formation of the modern state system. The treaty formalized the nation-state system through its commitment to the establishment of 'sovereign' states. It was believed in the field of international politics that the state now has a fixed conception through the idea of sovereignty. As David Boucher argues, 'the settlement provided for and gave formal recognition to the modern state system in Europe' (Osiander 2001, 260). Seyom Brown argues that 'even to this day two principles of interstate relations codified in 1648 constitute a normative core of international law, which are the principle of sovereignty and non-interference in each other's domestic affairs' (Osiander 2001, 261). Evans and Newnham's *Dictionary of World Politics* finds that several important principles that were subsequently to form the legal and political framework of modern interstate relations were established at Westphalia (Evans and Newnham 1990, 420). Hans Morgenthau is quoted in Osiander (2001, 261), asserting that certain "rules of international law were securely established in 1648" more specifically, "the Treaty of Westphalia made the territorial state the cornerstone of the modern state system." He also recognized Michael Sheehan's view that the settlement "formally recognized the concept of state sovereignty" (ibid), and Hendrik Spruyt's claim that "the peace of Westphalia formally acknowledged the system of sovereign states" (ibid). Even though Stephen Krasner dismissed the link between 1648 and the creation of the sovereign state, he argues that the peace of Westphalia was a breakpoint with the past, but not as one understood by students of international relations and law. By analyzing the above definitions, we can argue that the concept of sovereignty has formed its fixed place in international politics. But it is this idea about 'fixity' that has been traversed and challenged by many phenomena with a global reach, one among them being terrorism.

Terrorist groups today represent significant armed actors who can inflict consequential violence

outside the authority of states. The mere ability to contest the monopoly of violence in the state by these armed groups challenges the core of the Westphalian conception of the state. The four waves of terrorism traced by Rapoport had state-challenging elements. They challenged the capacity of the state by questioning primarily its control over borders. During the first wave, the movement of Russian anarchists across Europe became easier because better communication and transportation services facilitated their movement. By doing so, they could easily propagate their ideas and goals. Since they had a better reach, they were able to attract a large mass towards them. As Rapoport (2019, 49) notes, Proudhon's journeys showed that "they had more influence abroad than at home. Russian anarchists gave training to nationalist groups of various countries, even if they had different aims, like the Polish, the Armenians, and others, argues Rapoport.

The second wave also became prominent across borders because of the acknowledgment of revolutionary activities conducted before and the subsequent help from the diaspora communities. The third wave also depicted the extraterritorial reach of terrorism. An example by Rapoport is how different groups cooperated in attacks such as the Munich Olympic massacre of 1972 and the kidnapping of OPEC members in 1975, among others. The fourth wave, termed as religious wave by the author, is a contemporary trend of the phenomenon. It is in trend because of the extended audience. The world has, since its inception, been composed of people from various religions; what has changed with the distribution of these communities across the globe as opposed to the earlier times when they were usually concentrated in one geographical area. This provides an incentive to the one who propagates because people are inclined to whom they share certain beliefs, values, etc. This shows that the sovereignty of states has been impacted by the emergence of terrorism at the international level. States have become permeable entities to such activities. Violence is being inflicted whenever and wherever possible, without the sovereignty of states being a botheration. Therefore, what catalyzes the activity is a profound point. Because there are always different reasons to do so.

The driving reasons may be majorly ideological, strategic, and psychological, among others. In case the ideological underpinning is based on any global ideology/religion, then terrorist action represents an even greater challenge to the state-sovereignty system. The transition of terrorist groups away from direct state sponsorship of terrorism and towards more amorphous groups has made this a more potent threat to the Westphalian State System. Terrorism thus whether state-sponsored or non-state, can alter international relations in many ways. It could be intra or interstate, if the activity is specifically meant to target just one state, for let us say political reasons. The first response may be a counter-threat, followed by the adoption of new strategies and changes in policies. The moment the state alters its policies simply conveys how terrorism has been at least successful in threat-based persuasion. The

changing policies may favor certain sections and go against others. (Examples could be discriminatory visa policies.) Depends upon which group it was and what it wanted to alter. Apart from politics, a similar response may be visible if any other structure of society is targeted. In other instances, a group of states may be the target. Strategies for this may vary depending upon deliberation by a state and its allies.

Engendering State Conflict

Terrorism has the potential to ignite wars among states. The use of violence by terror groups has brought India and Pakistan, two nuclear powers, to the brink of war on multiple occasions. The friction thus emerged has been the reason for failed negotiations, and the possibility of peace and stability in the region looks bleak. This has led to the worsening of the relations between the two. Various means of negotiations have failed. These two countries are not the only examples where one can see interstate relations being impacted. As Raymond Aaron argues, ‘interstate relations involve in essence the alternatives of peace and war’ (Elrod 1976). Hence, the latter is more prominent in this case because, as Richard B Elrod argues, ‘the sources of international dissension and discord generally seem to overbalance the forces of harmony.’

More recently, especially after the 9/11 attacks, the escalation of conflict between states has increased. The launch of the war on terror is a prime example of worsening relations between states. Whether the US with Afghanistan or Pakistan and Afghanistan. Since the present world is considered to be a globalized village, any event happening at the international level has consequences at the national and sub-national levels. It is important to note that the emergence of terrorism can come from any area of the globe. It can originate from a sub-national level and spread to the national or international level. That is what has happened to most such movements. Hence, it is essential to analyze them from both a bottom-up and top-down approach. While the former connotes how national and international phenomena are defined by the sub-national factors, the latter is defined as vice versa (Giraudy et al. 2019). These approaches are mainly used in Comparative politics, but their theoretical framework can help in any field. Some other events that have been triggered by terrorism are summarized below.

One of the largest and most devastating conflicts that was precipitated by terrorism has been World War I itself (assassination of Archeduke Ferdiannd by a Serb terrorist). Apart from widespread destruction and death, it dismantled the entire political order based on **the Concert of Europe**. Though the concert essentially centred on Europe, some of its features did help in maintaining the international system for about a century. They are: focus on practicality between the extremes of an absolute consensus upon right and wrong in international relations, followed by the distribution and

equalization of responsibilities and opportunities among the states considered to be important to the system (Elrod 1976, 170). The Black Hand, a Serb group supported by the Serbian state, aimed to unify Bosnia and other areas with large Serb populations under the control of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, with Serbia. Austria always felt Serbia was a hindrance to maintaining its multi-ethnic empire. Austria's annexation of Bosnia in 1908 and Serbian ambitions to unite South East European Slavic people strained the relations further. The Balkan wars led to the dominant emergence of Serbia in the region. In 1914, the Black Hand assassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria, plunging Europe into war. European leaders wanted to ensure, through various measures, that the war that erupted in Europe would turn into a global war. Hence, the states started taking sides. Austria-Hungary received support from Germany to attack Serbia. Ultimately, Europe entered the war, and the First World War was the destined consequence.

The war resulted in the loss of almost half of the Serbian army to death, injury, or capture. Overall, the war in total led to over 10 million deaths. In the ensuing mega war, the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires collapsed, Russia turned communist in the revolution, and nations like Poland were reborn. These consequences were part of a minor event that engendered state conflict not just between two but many participants.

Components of State Capacity Undermined by Terrorism

5.1 Effect on Public Attitude

Terrorist violence often results in a loss of democratic legitimacy for many state institutions, and the failure to protect civilians is seen as a serious failure. If a government cannot protect its people, it is no government at all. The institutional role in shaping public attitude is vital. They do so through policy formulations, political communications, and advancing changes, among others. ‘People expect social institutions to function efficiently and impartially. The expectation of efficiency can mean a demand for speedy decision-making, a realization of certain social objectives employing decision-making, and impartiality would signify equal treatment to all citizens (Blom 1970, 110). But if the institutional capacity to formulate the right opinion of itself is lost among the public or gets tarnished, it impacts its capacity to regulate the public. They also face difficulty in getting the faith of the public back in themselves. Arguments of K Adeney can be introduced here as well. She argues that "minorities feel victimized either by the alienation of dominant language or culture or by the politics of ‘us’ and ‘them.’ (Adeney 2017). Applying the same thesis here, one can figure that when one group gets a monopoly of violence over the other, it makes others feel victimized and at one point or the other the conflict between the two may take strong turns. or what Wilkinson calls the ‘sparking of

countermobilization' (Wilkinson 2004). That would not only lead to violence, but if not dealt with properly, it can strengthen and fix the biases. Even a mere accommodation policy may not work because accommodation does not necessarily eliminate the conflict/violence.

The differential impact of terrorism on different communities exacerbates the deepening of inter-community biases. This is especially the case when the government response is weak or even complicit. For example, a government may adopt the policy of what P. Staniland calls "total warfare" towards a group, which means a monopoly of violence in the hands of one, in this case, the state. If the state does so, its question of neutrality is undermined. Rather, some groups may view the stance of the state as discriminatory, and that is when the biases towards not only the state but also the group get enhanced. Though the targets of terrorism are multiple, they, however, know the importance of public opinion. 'By sowing fear, actors hope that the public will put pressure on the target regime to enact policy concessions to militants or that policymakers, fearing the erosion of public support, will bend to the terrorist demands' (Avdan 2022).

These inter-community biases are reinforced by the media. The role of the media in disseminating biased narratives related to various groups has always added salt to the wounds. The increase in recent attacks against communities seen in France, Madrid, New Zealand, and other places is an excellent example of how community bias gets strengthened. Whether it is the publicizing of biased narratives by the media or accommodative tendencies depicted by certain outlets in favor of the act, in both cases formulation of biases takes place. At times, the state may use its capacity to generate public opinion in favor of its policies. A good example is the 2003 Iraq war. 'The Bush administration was able to manage public opinion before and during the war, with some comparisons with public opinion on other wars, particularly the 1991 Gulf War' (Muller 2021, 1). A visible consequence of such a policy was the strengthening of Islamophobia, not just in the West but overall in the world. Hence, the public attitude gets impacted either towards other groups or towards the state, whatever the context may be. The declining institutional capacity to regulate the existing ideational differences among its people leads to the vulnerability of both the state and its people. State and people become relational in this context. The vulnerability of one also defines the vulnerability of the other, not forgetting that the degrees may vary. People in this context can subscribe themselves to various ideas through internal or outside influence, thus propagating something which the state may feel against it. The state may adopt various repressive means to deal with such issues because of perceived threats, which in turn affects the attitude of the public towards the state. Thus, the act of terrorism overall influences and shapes the public attitude and opinion towards various groups.

5.2 Impact on State Capacity

The threat of terrorist violence forced states to augment their state capacities both in surveillance and small wars. It became a more accepted sort of method after the 9/11 attacks. The 9/11 attack was not considered merely an attack on the state. It led to debates about the violation of the rights of citizens, foreigners, etc. Having this in mind, the USA became conscious about safeguarding its territory from such massive attacks. After various discussions on it, the state decided to increase its surveillance measures. 'It quickly became clear after the attack that the global response to terrorism would involve augmenting various forms of surveillance' (Gazo and Haggerty 2005, 171). Thus, it became a handy tool for states to locate terrorist groups or their contacts. 'It was also a valuable asset for the US war in Afghanistan and has become a key dimension in the efforts of the Western nations to secure themselves against future attacks' (ibid). The process of surveillance was facilitated by what Haggerty and Erincson call 'surveillance assemblage', which refers to the means that help to make sense of the proliferating, decentralized, and uncoordinated regime of visibility' (Gazo 2005, 172).

Surveillance in this sense speaks of immense state capacities to penetrate deep into society. Haggerty and Gazo differentiate this surveillance from traditional ones by considering it not just a thing but a *'potentiality'* (Gazo and Haggerty 2005, 173). The easy availability of surveillance technology was greatly facilitated by the need for states to monitor communications among terrorists. The need for anti-terrorist surveillance has been justified in three ways. First, it can provide information that can be retrospectively analyzed to provide insights about terrorists and their operations, followed by its capacity to deter future attacks and allow authorities to thwart future attacks (Gazo and Haggerty 2005, 180-181). However, it has had a second-order effect in constraining the civil liberties of common people.

Governments have been eager to use the availability of these technologies to monitor their citizens. The **Patriot Act in** the USA provided both the template as well as ideological legitimacy to the more intrusive surveillance programs in other countries. In Osborne V. United States (1966), Justice Doughlas argued, 'We are rapidly entering an age of no privacy, where everyone is open to surveillance at all times; where there are no secrets from the government. The aggressive breaches of privacy by the government increased by geometric proportions (Heinrich, Ward). Canada's Public Safety Act was also drafted along the same lines. Most countries in the world now have such laws, especially those where such incidents are frequent. Like India, Canada, China, and others. They contain various measures by which such activities could be either stopped or hindered at least. Cumulatively, such bills have the potential to reduce individual privacy rights through an opportunistic expansion of institutional powers and the questionable use of such technologies for a host of unstated

purposes (Gazso and Haggerty 2005, 179).

Contemporary surveillance techniques have been designed in a fashion that permeates personal space very well. Legislation such as the US Patriot Act has been termed by Pikowsky as an ‘act of altering the balance of rights between the citizen and the state (ibid). Thus, surveillance, seen as a security measure, is not merely that. It has its limitations as well. It infringes on the rights of people; they can be monitored anywhere without a blink of an idea about the same. It also creates what Haggerty and Goza call *‘fear of the unseen’* (Gazso and Haggerty 2005, 183). People tend to ask for more security apparatus because they feel that it would make them feel more secure. It can also increase terrorists' capacity to attack. When terrorists are aware of sites that have been securitized by surveillance, they move towards spaces that are not yet under such measures. An example of the same would be the bombing of the Atlanta Olympics, where the considerable presence of security at the game prompted an attack on the concert outside the village (ibid). It also benefits the security market.

As more and more surveillance businesses are taking up. ‘Following the model of the military-industrial complex, powerful corporate interests are increasingly aligned with a push for greater surveillance and security devices irrespective of questions about their demonstrable need, adequate performance, or likely success’ (Goza and Haggerty 2005, 184). The problem is also increased by the fact that citizens are hardly aware of the consequences of deep surveillance measures. They lack the political imagination to assess the risks of such tools (ibid). Seeing it that way, the surveillance measures might be considered apt as per the context, but their long-term consequences are way too dangerous. Rather than taking the path of surveillance measures, which cost way too much, it could be better if the root of the issues is dealt with, for that is a prioritized option over being under an invisible and visible security apparatus. As *Benjamin Franklin* famously assesses, ‘Those people who are willing to trade their essential freedom for the sake of temporary security deserve and shall have neither, and will lose both.’

The need for localized and effective responses to terrorist violence has also resulted in the augmentation of police forces worldwide; this has transformed these forces effectively into paramilitaries, which has led to a loss of democratic accountability from these agencies. States have been exposed to violent acts, even by their forces. Like attacks on one community by the forces that belong to the dominant one. This also strengthened inter-community biases. Because it has been seen that the military or police force is inclined towards members of their community, irrespective of the act committed by them. This has been widely noted in countries like the USA, France, India, and others. In the USA, racist tendencies have led to an assessment of such implicit bias. In a series of

experiments by Stanford University, it was found that for police officers, 'Black faces looked more criminal than the white ones' (Wen 2020, BBC Future report). Such behavior reinforces biases and violent acts. This has also been observed in the case of Muslims overall, after the argumentation about 'terrorism' was associated broadly only with them. One example is India. In an article by 'The Hindu' based on a survey report, it was argued that Muslims feel there is bias in policing (The Hindu 2018). It is reinforced by the concept of appearances. Appearances decide whether one will be caught or set free. These examples help one grasp how systematic discrimination towards communities can impact their daily lives. Because even states have been visualized mostly to form unjustified laws. Given the benefit of lack of clarity and misinformation to the state, their laws are deemed to act like that, but some do it deliberately and institutionalize the biases. That is also a fact that cannot be ignored. Besides, the response of states may vary depending on their capacities. Jackson also talks about the differential capacity of the state. Thus, it can be argued that the augmentation of state capacity has increased the effectiveness of some states to deal with terrorist violence, but at the same time, the second-order effects have been detrimental to democratic accountability.

5.3 State Failure

Terrorism can spiral into broader insurgencies and rebellions and has often resulted in complete State failure. As far as failed states are concerned, security concerns may arise from threats such as terrorism and enforced migration (Cecon 2014). The event of 9/11 posed a question before the Western government related to the issue of state failure. It became a "quintessential example of securitization: the process by which issues are accorded security status or seen as a threat through political labeling, rather than a result of their real objective significance" (ibid). Such a marking gives the green light to Western governments for the implementation of inequitable policies in the global South (ibid). This has been observed in States like Somalia, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Afghanistan. In all of these cases, the terrorism snowballed into civil wars, and vast swathes of territory came into the hands of shadowy and amorphous groups. They have been considered, especially by the West, as states that provide ground or nourishment to activities like terrorism. For them, examples could be Afghanistan, Sudan, and others. However, establishing a direct link between terrorism and failed states is, to some extent, naive because it does not take into consideration that not all weak and failed states are plagued by terrorism, and the case of Afghanistan is not enough (ibid).

Such wars had a significant deleterious impact on the neighboring States, which had to devote a lot of resources to deal with issues like refugees, easy availability of guns, and safe avenues for drug trafficking. State failure also has the collateral effect of making the people of a deteriorating state leave the country, creating, consequently, massive refugee flows that destabilize neighboring countries,

as happened in the case of Africa (ibid). Also, for instance, since 1990, circa 100.000 exiles left Somalia and moved to bordering Kenya, with the side-effect of fuelling some of the inter-ethnic strains existing in the country (ibid). Through borders, 'not only weapons but also drugs and people become objects of criminal traffic as in the cases of Colombia and Myanmar' (ibid).

Thus, more than the perceived threat by Western countries from such states, it is these states that are on the brink of collapse. People of these countries are the primary audience that suffers every sort of violation and threat. Even if they decide to migrate or become immigrants to new places, there is no guarantee of their equal treatment. They may face more sociocultural identity issues in the migrated places, in the form of identity recognition, accommodation, and associated issues. Most Western states have been facing this issue to accommodate such people in the tussle between their status of being a 'Multi-nation' or 'Polyethnic' state (Wilkymlika). In the language of Huntington, 'The impacts of these substantial immigration movements are deemed to be the fuse of a cultural conflict ('clash of civilizations') between different social configurations (Cecon, 2014).

To deal with such emergent problems of state failure, the International Community had to formulate novel concepts like **R2P** (Responsibility to Protect) to legitimize international intervention. The major impetus for the R2P principle was the Bosnian and Rwandan crises. They became a base for the states to think about intervening in other states. Though there was a dilemma about sovereignty and intervention, the intensity of the atrocities forced them to initiate R2P. It rested upon three pillars. As per the *Global Centre For The Responsibility To Protect,* they are: Pillar ***One*** asserts that 'Every state has the Responsibility to Protect its populations from four mass atrocity crimes: genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing.' ***Pillar two*** speaks about 'The wider international community has the responsibility to encourage and assist individual states in meeting that responsibility.' The ***third pillar*** is 'If a state is manifestly failing to protect its populations, the international community must be prepared to take appropriate collective action, in a timely and decisive manner and by the UN Charter.'

The state intervention, however, became more problematic due to strategically motivated intervention in the case of Libya and failure to apply in the case of Syria. In the Libyan case, the UNSC acted promptly, and within no time the Gaddafi regime in Libya was struck down by various military coalitions under the broader framework of NATO. The act was carried out under Resolution 1973. Under this resolution, the UNSC, for the first time, authorized coercive military intervention in a sovereign state without the consent of that state's governing authorities.' (Zifack, n.d., 6). However, the council's resolution number 1973 received opposition from certain members; Brazil, China,

Germany, India, and Russia were the major ones. These stemmed in part from the commitment of Russia and China in particular to the principle of nonintervention in the affairs of sovereign states and in part from disagreements between Security Council members as to the most appropriate strategies to be deployed to bring the violence quickly to an end. (Zefick, n.d., 7).

Despite reservations, the act was considered to be a success. The main reasons were the authorization of the UNSC, support to the UNSC by regional bodies like the Human Rights Council and Arab League, and quick response by the UNSC with fewer delays (Zefick, n.d, 10). The role of the UNSC in Libya received major scrutiny during the crisis in Syria. The Syrian crisis was the test of the UNSC, as Syria broadly has the same issue as that of Libya, which is the crimes against civilians. But the response varied in this case. The demonstrators in Syria voiced their concerns about various socio-political issues, taking inspiration from the already erupted Arab Spring. The Bashar al-Assad regime had to tackle these massive protests. The government leashed heavily on them. Atrocities were at their peak, and the UNSC began to consider the situation. Every member of the Security Council expressed deep concern about the rapidly deteriorating Syrian situation. However, different emphases were visible when its members considered what action should be taken (Zifack, n.d., 16). For example, the UK voiced for violence to stop, Russia considered it as Syria's domestic matter, and India also vouched for a more peaceful approach (Zifack, n.d., 16-17). What was visible was only passing one resolution after the other. Each resolution was stuck over time due to reservations raised by various states. The states were busy with illusory paperwork, some signed and others vetoed, and meanwhile, the scathing environment of Syria proliferated. The international community had arrived at an impasse, and the Syrian death toll has since passed 8000 (Zifack, n.d., 26). The examples of Libya and Syria are prima facie evidence of state failures advanced by various reasons, which could be and in most cases are *'foreign-sponsored motivations.'* Such states then become volatile, especially in the hands of major powers, either directly or indirectly.

Conclusion

Terrorism as a phenomenon has existed long before the times when 'religious terrorism' became the keyword in the security studies lexicon. This paper has drawn attention to different aspects of interstate, intra-state, and international relations that the emergence of terrorism has brought with it. The paper has established that terrorism has the potential to alter contemporary security architecture, state centrality, and international legal regime in multiple ways. The paper has established that the term terrorism itself is not monolithic, and hence its various dimensions need to be taken into account while theorizing it. There are certain basic tenets acceptable to a wide range of scholars, like violence, sudden attacks, assassinations, and international character, etc.

By keeping them as basic premises, we glean that the centrality of the state, largely viewed in terms of sovereignty, is not the only component of the state that gets jolted. Rather, we garner that its impact sweeps across various strands like engendering state conflict, public attitude, state capacity, and state failure, among others. Such impact defines and redefines the power, authority, stability, peace, and other relations among groups, states, organizations, etc. That is why the usage of the term 'state centrism', at least in this examination, is used to connote aspects beyond sovereignty, though acknowledging the primary importance of the same. The paper has also tried to evaluate whether a conclusive judgment about the phenomenon could be reached or not. The aspect of state terrorism has often been neglected in the state, and the UN and other agencies also seem to be sceptical about its usage concerning the state and its allied branches. This again raises the question about the genuineness of the 'defining agency'. The phenomenon of terrorism has also altered the nature of state response to such activities with increasing use of surveillance methods and other algorithms, which in the future may have devastating effects on the individuality of human beings, as thinking beings rather than being programmed machines.

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