Indian Ocean Diplomacy: Comprehending the Indian Vision Ahead
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https://doi.org/10.66871/trf-j.v1i2.048##semicolon##
Indian Ocean##common.commaListSeparator## Security##common.commaListSeparator## Indian Ocean Region##common.commaListSeparator## Global South##common.commaListSeparator## Maritime Security##common.commaListSeparator## China##common.commaListSeparator## United Statesसार
The Indian Ocean Region (IOR) has been a vital juncture in the connectivity for trade, commerce, and shipping. The waters of this region have served as shipping lanes for economic development, as well as a hub for disputes, conflict, and activity in the larger African and Asian plateways. India’s approach towards the region can be largely attributed to its geostrategic location, which also further promulgates foundations for its maritime security. This research paper focuses on India’s ambitions in the IOR and its geopolitical manoeuvres around the region, including an analysis of US and Chinese activities in the region before Trump's second term as president of the United States. The argument of the paper lies in the notion that the IOR should not be viewed through the lens of a single economy but rather, the individual voices and votes of each actor in the region. This intends to place India, not as a messiah, unlike China, developing focal points in maritime security, domain awareness, littoral state engagement, economic interests, etc., but rather one of their own whose interests in the regions are as significant as their people and their economy. It also showcases facets of India’s toolkit, approaches towards the region, and shapes the discourse for India’s future ambitions in and around the region.
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