The Research Frontline - Journal
(Vol. I, Issue No. 4, July - Sept 2026)

ALLAHABAD ACADEMIC PRESS
a publishing company

e-ISSN: 3139-2253 | DOI: https://doi.org/ 10.66871/trf-j.v1i4.020

From Millet to Nation-State: Competing National Projects and Identity Transformation in Turkey and Lebanon

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Abstract

The transition from ottoman empire to modern nation state reshaped patterns of communal belonging across the Middle East. This paper examines the transformation that unfolded in Turkey and Lebanon. These two post-Ottoman states with shared imperial legacy but diverged along contrasting paths of nation-building. Rather than treating the Ottoman millet system as a direct ancestor of modern national identity, the paper examines how inherited communal identities were reshaped through different state-building strategies. In Turkey, the Kemalist project sought to build a centralised and secular national identity; later, especially under the Justice and Development Party (AKP), the relationship between Turkish nationalism, religion, and the Ottoman was reconfigured. Lebanon, by contrast, took a different path: it built communal diversity into the state through a confessional power-sharing structure allowing sectarian identities to be central to political representation and citizenship. This paper uses a comparative-historical approach and a constructivist lens on nationalism and identity. It looks at the role of state institutions, political discourse and the competing role of nationhood in determining these divergent paths. It contends that post-Ottoman identity change was not a simple, uniform transition from communal belonging to national citizenship. Instead, it was shaped by competing national projects and institutional choices through which states managed diversity.

Keywords: Ottoman Millet System, Identity Politics, Nation-Building, Nationalism, Communal Identity, Confessionalism.

Received: 5/08/2026 | **Accepted:** 09/08/2026 | **Published:** 10/11/2026

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Introduction

The collapse of the Ottoman Empire marked more than the end of imperial rule (Findley, 2010). It has reshaped the perspective on how communities understood political belonging, citizenship, and collective identity. The transition from empire to nation-state, however, did not follow a single path across the former Ottoman territories. For centuries, the Ottoman Empire managed religious and communal diversity through institutions that gave different communities a degree of recognition and autonomy (Brude, 2014). The millet system was an important part of this arrangement. It should not be seen as the same as modern national identity. After the empire collapsed, new nation-states gave these older forms of belonging a new political meaning, and the transition to the nation-state did not erase earlier identities; it reworked them.

This transition was not uniform in the Middle East (Makdisi 2000). The examples of Turkey and Lebanon have made it easy to understand the pattern, as they both emerged from the Ottoman order and shared a lot of deep religious and communal diversity, but they took very different paths in nation-building. In Turkey, the new republic launched an ambitious, state-led nation- building project. Kemalist reforms pushed a centralised vision of national identity, aiming to forge a shared political identity within the new borders (Zurcher, 2017). This project sought to reduce the political importance of religious and communal identities in favour of a unified national identity. Also, this approach aimed at constructing a unified civic identity whose further motive was to replace preexisting communal affiliations. In Lebanon, however, communal differences became embedded in state institutions. Confessional power sharing gave religious communities a formal role in political representation (Salibi, 1988). Over time, this made sectarian identity a lasting feature of Lebanese politics. Instead of eroding and absorbing communal identities, the Lebanese political system incorporated them into the formal machinery of the state.

The contrast between these two types of identity brings up a crucial question: Why did societies with a shared Ottoman inheritance diverge so dramatically in their journeys toward national identity and political variety? The answer is not merely in the ethnic or religious diversity but in how states tried to manage and remake that diversity. These studies understand national identity as a political and historical process, built by institutions, political actors, narratives and continuous struggles over belonging (Smith, 1991). These Differences render Turkey and Lebanon useful comparative cases to examine the remaking of communal belonging through nation-building.

This paper compares how identity has changed in Turkey and Lebanon, from the Ottoman millet system to modern nation- building projects. It focuses on how the nation-building efforts of Turkey and Lebanon transformed older communal identities into modern political ones. The paper argues that the shift from the Ottoman way of communal belonging to national citizenship was neither linear nor uniform. In fact, it was produced because of institutional decisions made by political elites and state institutions in their bid to define the nation and handle social diversity (Anderson, 2006). Turkey pursued a centralised nation-building project, while Lebanon has formalised communal disparities through confessional power sharing. Neither produced a settled national identity. But both still grapple with tensions about belonging, citizenship and nationhood. This comparison is important because it doesn't treat the Ottoman legacy as a single cause of today's identity politics. A common imperial history does not necessarily lead to similar political outcomes.

What matters is how that legacy is understood through subsequent nation-building projects. The study presents a comparative analysis of Turkey and Lebanon, within the same framework, and shows how historical legacies and state institutions shape different ideas of nationhood. It contributes to wider debates on nationalism and post-imperial state-building. Rather than a clean shift from one identity system to another, it shows that these changes were contested and political (Barkey 2008).

This paper uses a qualitative comparative historical approach. It draws on scholarship on Ottoman communal organisation, nationalism and state formation. It also looks at constitutional narratives of political discourse and historical narratives. This comparison emphasises how each state defined political membership; it also looks at how national narratives were constructed. According to this approach, the paper shows not only how Turkey and Lebanon differ, but what those differences reveal about the broader challenge of building national identities in post- imperial societies.

Methodology

The researcher has used a qualitative methodology with a comparative-historical research design in this paper. Turkey and Lebanon are selected as comparative cases because both show the transformation of the Ottoman Empire but developed different approaches to nation-building and identity politics. The study relies on secondary sources, including books, peer-reviewed journal articles, historical studies, and relevant political and constitutional documents.

The categories of identity and nationalism are analysed constructively as processes which are historically and politically contingent. The study focuses on the transformation of communal belonging, the formation of national identities, state-building strategies, citizenship, confessionalism, and political representation.

The paper compares the Turkish and Lebanese cases to understand how different institutional arrangements shape political belonging. The paper discusses the transition from the Ottoman order to the centralised republican national project in Turkey and its reconfiguration under the AKP. In Lebanon, the problem lies in the integration of communal identities into the political system through confessional arrangements. Instead of assuming a direct link between the millet system and modern national identity, the study focuses on the reinterpretation of a shared Ottoman past within diverse national projects and institutional responses to diversity.

Conceptualising Identity Transformation in the Post-Imperial Era

The Ottoman Empire has governed a socially and religiously diverse population for centuries; political belonging was not tied to a single concept of national identity. Religious affiliation became the main way communities were organised and recognised by the state. The millet system provided a framework in which certain non-Muslim communities managed their own religious, educational, and communal affairs, while remaining within the broader Ottoman political order (Brude and Lewis 1982). However, the millet system was not an early form of nationalism; its meaning and institution shifted over time, shaped by changing political and administrative needs.

For this study, the millet system is less a model of harmony and more a particular way of organising

difference. Communal identities existed within a wider empire of framework rather than separate nation-states. Religious communities could be recognised as distinct, yet still belonged to a shared imperial political order. This created a relationship between communal belonging and political membership that was quite different from the later nation-state model (Barkey, 2008). Individuals did not have to shed communal ties to belong politically. But that autonomy was not absolute. It sat within a hierarchy where the state kept the final say. The significance of this distinction is greatest in the late Ottoman period. The reforms of the nineteenth century carried new notions of equality, of citizenship, of belonging together. The Tanzimat reforms and later Ottomanism sought to create a wider identity without eliminating diversity (Karpat, 2001). Ottoman citizenship existed as a concept alongside pre-existing communal identities, not as a replacement for them. These reforms did not create a monolithic Ottoman identity but reshaped the relationship between religious community, political equality and emerging concepts of nationhood.

The changing meaning of the millet system mirrored wider political and social shifts. As nationalism gained ground in the late Ottoman era, identities once framed mainly through religion acquired a national and political meaning. Communities started to speak not only in religious terms but also in the language of nationality, shared history, and self-determination. This slower shift did not erase older forms of belonging, but imperial, communal, and national identities coexisted. National ideas came into communal life, and communal identities did not vanish; they coexisted and often competed with national projects. (Makdisi, 2008). The late Ottoman period marked a turning point in how political identity was understood. Nationalism did not replace communal ties overnight. It gradually reshaped older forms of belonging and gave them new political weight. This paper treats the millet system as a historical starting point, not a direct explanation for today's identity politics. It helps show that diversity can be managed without everyone sharing a single identity. With the rise of the nation-state, however, sovereignty and citizenship became central. Against this background, the key question is how post-Ottoman political projects responded to inherited diversity.

As imperial structures declined, territory, sovereignty and citizenship became more closely linked to the nation. Communities that had long lived within a wider imperial framework were slowly integrated into new national projects. These projects did not simply preserve older loyalties, but embedded communal ties in new political contexts, in which they could at times support and at times clash with national aspirations. National identity did not simply replace older loyalties, but communal ties were reconstituted and contested in the emerging political order. National identity is seen as an ongoing political process, not as a fixed or permanent category. Benedict Anderson argues that nations are imagined communities. People feel a kinship with a nation without knowing most of their fellow members. Ernest Gellner links nationalism to the emergence of the modern state and its institutions. Anthony D. Smith finds common memories, cultural symbols and historical traditions in the creation of national identity. These perspectives reveal that national identity is built on the relationship between political change and historical continuity. It doesn't necessarily replace older forms of collective belonging. Rather, new political situations tend to reconfigure and rearticulate pre-existing identities in national projects. This process was not simply extinguished but was instead transformed via existing religious and communal identities which were progressively re-articulated within competing national projects in the post-Ottoman context. In plural societies, nation-building becomes more complex, as political actors need to determine who is included in the national community and on what basis (Anderson,

2006). Some states try to create a shared national identity. Others maintain older communal identities in the national framework. It puts inclusion and exclusion at the heart of the process. Citizenship, political representation, language, education and public history are important sites of negotiation and contestation of national belonging. These differences were especially visible in the post-Ottoman Middle East, where political actors propounded competing ideas about the meaning of the nation and the groups that should belong to it. These projects moved beyond political rhetoric to shape the institutions, laws and public narratives through which belonging was expressed (Taylor, 1994). Thus, the transition from empire to nation-state was a slow and contested process, not a simple movement from communal to national identity. There was not one model for the successor states; each reacted differently to the imperial inheritance. In Turkey, there was increasing centralisation and territoriality of nationhood; in Lebanon, communal diversity was institutionalised.

Nation-building becomes more complex in diverse societies because political actors have to decide who belongs to the national community and on what basis (Anderson, 2006). Some states seek to build a common national identity, while others retain older communal identities within the national framework. This makes questions of inclusion and exclusion central to the process. Citizenship, political representation, language, education, and public history become important areas through which national belonging is negotiated and contested. These differences were particularly visible in the post-Ottoman Middle East, where political actors advanced competing ideas about the meaning of the nation and the groups that should form part of it. Such projects were not limited to political rhetoric; they also influenced institutions, laws, and public narratives through which belonging was defined (Taylor, 1994). The shift from empire to nation-state was therefore gradual and contested, rather than a simple movement from communal to national identity. The successor states did not follow a single model, as each responded differently to the same imperial inheritance. In Turkey, nationhood evolved in increasingly centralised and territorial terms, while Lebanon incorporated communal diversity into its political system. Comparing these two paths sets the stage for the following sections, which examine Turkey and Lebanon in detail.

Turkey: From Ottoman Communal Order to Centralised National Identity

The roots of modern political identity in Turkey emerged in the late Ottoman Empire as political pressures on the old order increased. Ottoman elites began to reconsider how political belonging could be structured in an unstable empire. One response was Ottomanism, to create a shared framework for both Muslim and non-Muslim subjects. At the same time, Turkish nationalism grew in influence, emphasising language, culture, and shared historical experience as the base for a distinct political community (Mardin, 2006). The Young Turk period marked an important shift in this search for unity, as different political groups proposed competing visions for the future of the state. Some remained supporters of a wider Ottoman political identity, but as imperial decline continued, others increasingly called for a territorially defined nation. The establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923 was not merely the change of a regime, but a project to reconstruct political unity based on sovereign territory, common citizenship and a national identity. The Republican leadership rejected the plural political order of the Ottoman Empire. Political belonging was no longer primarily organised through religious communities. Instead, the new state sought to establish a common national identity centred

on Turkish citizenship (Zurcher, 2004).

The shift did not erase the empire's diversity; instead, it redefined the place of that diversity within a state that increasingly valued political unity and a shared national identity. One of the central challenges for the Republic was how linguistic, religious and cultural differences would fit within an increasingly centralised vision of Turkish nationhood. The policies introduced in the early Republican years reflected one particular answer to this question, helping shape the institutional foundations of modern Turkish national identity.

The establishment of the Republic marked the beginning of a new phase in Turkish nation-building. Under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the Republican leadership sought to construct a unified national identity around Turkish citizenship, territorial sovereignty, and secular state institutions. The new political order represented a clear departure from the Ottoman system, where political belonging had been organised through multiple religious and communal affiliations. Republican nation-building instead placed the Turkish nation at the centre of political life and sought to create a common identity among the population. This project was closely connected to the wider process of modernisation. The leadership viewed political and social transformation as necessary for consolidating the new republic and strengthening its sovereignty. Reforms in education, language, law, and public institutions were not only administrative changes, but they also contributed to the formation of a particular understanding of Turkish national identity. The adoption of a new alphabet, the reform of the education system, and the replacement of religious legal arrangements with secular institutions helped establish a common framework of citizenship. At the same time, the emphasis on a unified national identity created tensions around existing linguistic, religious, and cultural differences. Groups whose identities did not easily fit within the emerging definition of Turkish nationhood faced increasing pressure to adapt. As Mardin (2006) argues, the transformation of political authority during this period was closely linked to the effort to establish the modern state as the primary source of political authority.

The demand for a unified national identity also revealed the shortcomings of the Kemalist vision. One of the most important and enduring challenges was the Kurdish question, along with ongoing debates about the role of religion in public life. These debates reveal that national identity was not formed by political ideals alone, but also by policies on language, education, citizenship and public recognition. The Republican project was not to erase diversity, but to make it fit into a centralised model. Yet ethnic, religious, and cultural differences continued to shape political life, reminding us that the boundaries of the nation remained open to contestation and reinterpretation.

The rise of the Justice and Development Party marked a new phase in Turkey's debate over national identity. Unlike earlier Republican narratives that often-framed modernization as a clear break from the Ottoman legacy, the AKP began to draw on that legacy as a resource for rethinking Turkey's identity and political past. This gave greater public visibility and legitimacy to religious and conservative identities that had remained at the margins of the Kemalist model (White, 2017). Although this is often described as neo-Ottomanism, its significance goes beyond foreign policy. It reflects a broader rethinking of national identity and the relationship between state, society, and historical memory. By bringing aspects of the Ottoman past into contemporary political discourse, the AKP altered how questions of belonging and identity were discussed. The reinterpretation of inherited diversity did not

remove these differences; rather, it placed them within a changing political framework that reshaped the way they entered public and political life (Yavuz, 2009).

The AKP years did not erase the Republican nation-building project, but they did reshape some of its underlying assumptions. Turkish national identity remained central, though its relationship with religion, Ottoman history, and cultural diversity began to change. This introduced a new layer of political contestation. While one view of identity stayed close to Kemalist secular nationalism, another gave more space to religious expression and the Ottoman past. Turkey's experience suggests that national identity is not fixed or permanently settled; it is continually renegotiated through political and social change. The transition from the Ottoman order to Kemalist nationalism and, later, to the AKP's reconfiguration of identity was not a straightforward movement from one stable definition of Turkishness to another. Rather, it reflected continuing debates about the meaning of Turkishness, about which interpretations of the past should shape the present and about how diverse identities can find a place within the state.

Lebanon: the making of confessional identity

The Ottoman millet framework is better understood as a system for managing religious diversity, rather than as a direct blueprint for modern Lebanese sectarianism. It gave religious communities an important place in social and legal affairs, but did not create a political system based on sectarian power-sharing. That relationship between communal identity and political authority changed significantly during the 19th and 20th centuries, especially through Ottoman reforms, European intervention, and the French Mandate. Lebanese confessionalism therefore emerged more through the adaptation and institutionalisation of earlier communal arrangements than through simple continuity with the Ottoman system (Salibi, 1988).

The 19th century was a time when the way communities related to political authority in Ottoman Lebanon started to shift. Ottoman reforms tried to strengthen central control, while growing European involvement increasingly influenced the region's religious communities. After the 1860 conflict, the Mutasarrifate system created a new administrative setup where communal representation became more directly tied to how the region was governed. Later, the creation of Greater Lebanon in 1920 brought various religious and regional communities under one territory for the first time. So instead of pushing for unity through centralisation, as seen in Turkey, Lebanon incorporated difference into its political framework. Over time, older forms of communal belonging were reshaped and became more political within the structure of the new state (Hanf 1993).

The Lebanese National Project evolved alongside a political system in which communal representation became a core part of state organisation, rather than merely reflecting religious diversity. Over time, confessionalism developed into an institutional framework through which political authority, representation, and access to public office were negotiated among communities. The 1923 constitution provided a formal basis for this arrangement by affirming equality among citizens while still allowing political representation to account for confessional affiliation (Traboulsi, 2007). As a result, the state tried to balance a shared political community with the ongoing importance of religious com-

munities, making confessionalism central to its nation-building process.

The 1943 National Pact did not replace communal identities, but rather reaffirmed a political consensus already in existence between the country's main Christian and Muslim communities. Rather than forging a single notion of citizenship, it sought to maintain stability by distributing representation to the religious communities of the country. These arrangements started to take on a consociational logic, based on elite cooperation and the sharing of political power, as Lijphart (1969) has noted. This helped to create some stability, but it also solidified sect affiliation as a permanent basis for political competition. The war exposed the limitations of this system, its inability to address deeper political and social rifts. The Taif Agreement of 1989 sought to redress the balance of power between the Christian and Muslim communities without eliminating confessionalism per se. Lebanon's nation-building project evolved through accommodation, not homogenization, over time. Instead of removing communal identities from politics, the state incorporated them into its institutions, making confessionalism both a mechanism of governance and a continuing space of political contestation.

The institutionalisation of confessionalism reshaped the meaning of citizenship in Lebanon by linking formal citizenship with communal representation. Although Lebanese citizens share a common legal status and territorial identity, political representation and many aspects of public life continue to be organised through confessional affiliation. In practice, sectarian identity functions not only as a religious or social affiliation but also as a political category through which representation, political networks and access to state institutions are structured. This produces a distinctive form of political belonging in which national citizenship coexists with the continued political significance of religious communities. At the same time, sectarian and national identities in Lebanon are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Lebanese citizens often combine a sense of belonging to the state with strong communal, regional, or broader Arab attachments. Rather than replacing these multiple forms of identification. The Lebanese political system has incorporated them into its institutional framework. Consequently, Lebanese nationalism has evolved through competing understandings of the relationship between territorial citizenship, communal affiliation, and Arab identity (El-Khazen, 2020). The central issue is therefore not the presence of multiple identities but the way in which these identities are politically negotiated within the institutions and political order of the Lebanese state.

The Lebanese experience demonstrates that communal identities were not simply preserved from the Ottoman period, but gradually reorganised, politicised, and institutionalised within the structures of the modern state. Confessionalism, therefore, evolved as a mechanism for managing diversity, but also reinforced sectarian affiliation as a lasting basis of political representation and competition. Compared with Turkey, Lebanon represents a different trajectory of post-Ottoman nation-building. While the Turkish Republic pursued national integration through a more centralised conception of citizenship and national identity, Lebanon incorporated communal representation into the institutional framework of the state. This comparison shows that the transition from Ottoman rule did not produce a single model of nationhood. Instead, similar imperial legacies were reinterpreted through different institutional choices, historical experiences and competing national projects, resulting in distinct understandings of political belonging and national identity. Turkey and Lebanon inherited a common Ottoman legacy but constructed different national projects through distinct political and institutional trajectories.

Turkey and Lebanon: A Comparative Analysis

Turkey and Lebanon emerged from the transformation of the Ottoman Empire through different processes of state formation, but both inherited societies where communal identities continued to matter. The end of Ottoman rule did not simply erase these identities. Instead, they were reshaped within new territorial and political settings. The important difference lies in how the two states dealt with this inherited diversity. Turkey moved towards a more unified national framework based on centralisation and a common understanding of citizenship, whereas Lebanon incorporated communal representation into its political institutions.

This contrast shows that the shift from empire to the nation-state was not a straightforward move from communal belonging to national identity. The Ottoman past provided an important historical background, but it did not determine what national identity would look like afterwards. The institutions created in the new states, the choices made during nation-building, and different understandings of political belonging all influenced the direction taken by Turkey and Lebanon. The important question, therefore, is not simply which older identities survived, but how they were reshaped and given new political meaning within the institutions of the new states.

The contrasting approaches of Turkey and Lebanon are particularly visible in their management of internal diversity. The Turkish republican project emphasized centralization and a common national framework. Education, law, public administration and other state institutions were used to strengthen a unified conception of national identity and citizenship. This approach sought to reduce the political importance of older communal divisions. However, centralisation did not eliminate identity-based contestation. Questions concerning Kurdish identity, religion and cultural recognition continued to challenge the boundaries of Turkishness. The rise of the AKP introduced another phase in this process. In place of completely replacing the republican national framework, the AKP sought to reinterpret it by giving greater prominence to religious identity, conservative values and Ottoman historical memory. Turkish national identity thus remained central, but its meaning became subject to renewed political competition.

Lebanon followed a different path. Communal identities were incorporated directly into political institutions, with confessional representation becoming an important mechanism for distributing political power. The National Pact and later the Taif Agreement reflected attempts to maintain political accommodation among different communities. This partly corresponds to Lijphart's concept of consociationalism, where divided societies are governed through mechanisms such as elite accommodation and communal representation. Yet institutional recognition also produced a tension. While confessional arrangements could provide communities with political security, they could simultaneously reinforce sectarian boundaries and make communal affiliation an enduring basis of political competition. The disparity between the two countries is therefore not simply that Turkey pursued nationalism while Lebanon pursued sectarianism. Instead, Turkey sought to integrate diversity within a centralised national framework, whereas Lebanon incorporated communal difference into the organisation of political power.

The experiences of Turkey and Lebanon also reveal the difficulties involved in managing diversity. In

Turkey, the legitimacy of the state was intimately connected with the creation of a homogenous national community. But disagreement over secularism, religion, ethnicity and the meaning of Turkishness shows that centralisation cannot fully resolve questions of identity. The AKP's use of religious and Ottoman references further demonstrates how national projects may be reinterpreted rather than replaced. In Lebanon, state legitimacy has been based more on accommodating communal differences. Confessional arrangements provided a mechanism for the participation of different communities in political life, but they also allowed sectarian categories and political elites to remain deeply embedded in the state.

Both cases therefore demonstrate a central tension in identity politics: institutions designed to manage difference can also reproduce the differences they seek to manage. Centralisation may strengthen national cohesion but generate demands for recognition, while institutionalised pluralism can protect communal representation but reinforce communal divisions. The comparison ultimately challenges the idea that the end of Ottoman rule produced a straightforward transition from communal identity to national citizenship (Khalidi, 2009). Turkey and Lebanon represent different ways of reorganising inherited forms of belonging within modern states. Turkey developed a more centralised national project, later reinterpreted through competing political narratives, while Lebanon incorporated communal representation into its political institutions. The Ottoman legacy, therefore, did not produce a single model of national identity. Its political meaning was reshaped through different institutional choices and competing national projects. The comparison demonstrates that post-Ottoman identity transformation was neither linear nor uniform; it depended on how states defined political membership, managed diversity and constructed legitimate forms of belonging.

Conclusion

The transition from the Ottoman Empire to the modern nation-state did not produce a uniform transformation of identity across the Middle East. The comparison of Turkey and Lebanon demonstrates that the end of Ottoman rule did not simply replace communal belonging with national citizenship. Instead, older forms of identity were reworked within new territorial states through different political institutions and competing national projects.

Turkey and Lebanon shared an Ottoman imperial legacy, but their approaches to nation-building differed considerably. Turkey's republican project emphasized centralization, secularism and a common conception of national citizenship. Yet the persistence of debates over ethnicity, religion and cultural recognition showed that Turkish national identity remained contested. The later AKP period further reconfigured this national project by bringing religious identity, conservative values and Ottoman historical memory more prominently into the understanding of Turkish belonging. Lebanon followed a different path. Rather than attempting to minimise communal identities within a single national framework, the Lebanese political system incorporated communal representation into state institutions. Confessionalism provided a mechanism for political accommodation, but it also made sectarian affiliation an enduring feature of political competition. Lebanese national identity consequently developed alongside, rather than in place of, communal belonging.

The comparison therefore suggests that the post-Ottoman transformation of identity should be understood as a process of reconfiguration rather than replacement. Turkey and Lebanon demonstrate two different ways of managing inherited diversity: one centred more strongly on centralised national integration and the other on institutionalised communal accommodation. Neither approach completely resolved the tension between national unity and social diversity. Ultimately, the Ottoman legacy did not determine a single path towards nationhood. Its meaning was reshaped by state institutions, political actors and competing ideas of belonging. The experiences of Turkey and Lebanon show that national identity is not a fixed outcome of state formation but an ongoing and contested political project. The transition from millet-based communal organisation to the nation-state was therefore neither linear nor uniform; it produced different forms of political belonging according to how emerging states chose to define, accommodate and manage diversity.

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